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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
 
No. 19-1163 
________________ 
 
 
JOSEPH DONOHUE, Executor of the Estate of SUSAN DONOHUE, individually and 
on behalf of all persons similarly situated; DEBORAH 
KINEST, individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, 
       Appellants 
 
v. 
 
THE RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY; 
RETIREMENT BOARD OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY 
 
 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:17-cv-01167) 
District Judge: Hon. Cynthia Reed Eddy 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 21, 2019 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., PORTER, and COWEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  November 18, 2019) 
______________ 
 
OPINION∗ 
______________ 
                                              
∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
Joseph Donohue and Deborah Kinest (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal the 
dismissal of their complaint, which alleged procedural and substantive due process claims 
against Allegheny County’s disability benefit approval process. Their procedural due 
process claim fails because they did not pursue available administrative processes. Their 
substantive due process claim fails because the challenged statutory provisions survive 
rational basis review. We will affirm the District Court’s dismissal. 
I 
Susan Donohue, an employee of Allegheny County, developed health problems 
and applied for disability benefits from the Retirement System of Allegheny County and 
the Retirement Board of Allegheny County (collectively, the “Board”). Allegheny 
County provides disability benefits for longtime employees who three Board-selected 
practicing physicians conclude are “totally and permanently disabled physically.” See 16 
Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4711(a). 
Donohue filed several applications for disability benefits and seven Board-selected 
physicians examined her. Each physician found that she was not “totally and permanently 
disabled physically.” The Board therefore denied Donohue’s applications for benefits. 
Donohue requested and received two appeal hearings. Donohue had the right to subpoena 
and to cross-examine the Board-selected physicians at the hearings but declined to do so. 
The Board affirmed the denial of benefits. 
Donohue appealed the Board’s denial to state court. In the same state-court appeal, 
she also brought a class action claim against the Board alleging procedural and 
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substantive due process violations of the Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
The Board removed her due process claims to federal district court. Donohue 
administratively closed her state-court appeal supposedly until her federal class action 
was resolved, but she later abandoned the state-court appeal altogether. While the federal 
action was pending, Donohue passed away, so her husband Joseph Donohue—the 
administrator of her estate—was substituted as named plaintiff. 
Eventually, Debora Kinest was added as a second named plaintiff. Kinest worked 
for Allegheny County and applied to the Board for disability benefits after developing 
health issues. Three Board-selected physicians examined Kinest, and each found she was 
not “totally and permanently disabled physically.” The Board denied Kinest’s application 
based on the physicians’ opinions. Unlike Donohue, Kinest did not request an appeal 
hearing of the Board’s denial of benefits or appeal the denial to state court. 
In federal court, the Board moved to dismiss the class action for failure to state a 
claim. The District Court granted the Board’s motion. Donohue and Kinest timely 
appealed. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
We review the District Court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss de novo. 
Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 n.2 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). 
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In 
assessing plausibility, we construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.” Carpenters Health v. Mgmt. Res. Sys., Inc., 837 F.3d 378, 382 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(citation omitted). 
III 
A 
 
On appeal, Appellants first argue that the District Court improperly dismissed their 
claims that the Board violated Donohue and Kinest’s procedural due process rights. 
Generally, to state a claim alleging a procedural due process violation, “a plaintiff 
must allege that (1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of ‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the 
procedures available to him did not provide ‘due process of law.’” Hill v. Borough of 
Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233–34 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 
But “a plaintiff must [also] have taken advantage of the processes that are 
available to him or her, unless those processes are unavailable or patently inadequate.” 
Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000). This requirement is not procedural 
exhaustion but ensures that “the harm alleged has occurred.” Id. “[A] procedural due 
process violation cannot have occurred when the governmental actor provides apparently 
adequate procedural remedies and the plaintiff has not availed himself of those 
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remedies.” Id. (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 126 (1990)); see also Elsmere 
Park Club, L.P. v. Town of Elsmere, 542 F.3d 412, 420–24 (3d Cir. 2008) (barring 
procedural due process claims because plaintiff “could have availed itself of [the] facially 
adequate postdeprivation process”). 
The District Court found that Appellants possessed a property right in their claim 
for disability benefits.1 But the District Court ultimately concluded that Appellants’ 
procedural due process claim was barred because neither Donohue nor Kinest pursued 
available procedures to challenge the Board’s denial of benefits. Specifically, the District 
Court relied on Donohue’s failure to pursue her state-court appeal or subpoena the Board-
selected physicians and Kinest’s failure to request an appeal hearing. 
Appellants do not dispute that Donohue and Kinest failed to pursue these 
procedures after their denials from the Board. But Appellants argue these failures should 
be excused because the procedures are inadequate for two reasons. First, they contend 
that the Board is not authorized by law to do anything meaningful at a hearing. And 
second, they assert that cross-examining the physicians would have been futile. 
Appellants do not carry their burden to show that “access to procedure is 
absolutely blocked or [that] there is evidence that the [Board’s] procedures are a sham[.]” 
See Alvin, 227 F.3d at 118 (citation omitted). That other applicants have successfully 
obtained benefits after appeal hearings and remand from the Board suggests the 
                                              
1 Because the District Court properly found that Appellants’ procedural due process claim 
was barred, we need not decide whether Appellants possessed a property interest under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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procedures are adequate. And Appellants fail to explain why subpoenaing and cross-
examining the Board-selected physicians is futile or why Donohue abandoned her state-
court appeal. Thus, we cannot say that the Board’s procedures are “patently inadequate.” 
See Alvin, 227 F.3d at 116. 
Because “there is a process on the books that appears to provide due process, 
[Appellants] cannot skip that process and use the federal courts as a means to get back 
what they want[ ].” Alvin, 227 F.3d at 116 (citations omitted). So we will affirm the 
District Court’s dismissal of Appellants’ procedural due process claim. 
B 
Next, Appellants argue that the District Court erred when it dismissed Appellants’ 
substantive due process claim.  
Where a legislative act does not burden “certain fundamental rights and liberty 
interests,” it is subject to rational basis review. Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 79 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). Rational basis review asks whether “there is a legitimate 
state interest that [ ] could be rationally furthered by the statute.” N.J. Retail Merchs. 
Ass’n v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 374, 398 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Although 
not “toothless,” rational basis review is essentially a “strong presumption of 
constitutionality” that “allows legislative choices considerable latitude.” Heffner, 745 
F.3d at 79 (citations omitted). 
Before the District Court, and now on appeal, Appellants argued that § 4711(a) 
fails rational basis review because the three-physician approval requirement renders the 
physicians’ discretion unreviewable. As a result, Appellants argue, the statute permits the 
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arbitrary denial of benefits to eligible applicants. The District Court rejected this 
argument. It found that the statute’s three-physician approval requirement rationally 
relates to the legitimate interests of limiting the Board’s discretion, preventing waste, and 
preserving the financial condition of the pension fund by leaving the benefits eligibility 
determination to medical professionals. We agree with the District Court’s analysis. 
IV 
The District Court properly dismissed Appellants’ procedural and substantive due 
process challenges, so we will affirm. 
